“It is not open to question that one who has acquired rights of property necessarily based upon a statute may not attack that statute as unconstitutional, for he cannot both assail it and rely upon it in the same proceeding. *528 Hurley v. Commission of Fisheries, 257 U.S. 223, 225, 42 S.Ct. 83, 66 L.Ed. 206.”
[Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515, 49 S.Ct. 235 (U.S., 1929)]
"The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275."
[Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)]
"The reach of the Fifteenth Amendment against contrivances by a state to thwart equality in the enjoyment of the right to vote by citizens of the United States regardless of race or color, has been amply expounded by prior decisions. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368. The Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race. When in Guinn v. United States, supra, the Oklahoma "grandfather clause" was found violative of the Fifteenth Amendment, Oklahoma was confronted with the serious task of devising a new registration system consonant with her own political ideas but also consistent with the Federal Constitution. We are compelled to conclude, however reluctantly, that the legislation of 1916 partakes too much of the infirmity of the "grandfather clause" to be able to survive."
[Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)]
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 at 540, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1185 (1965)
"It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution." Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583. "Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied,' Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 644, or manipulated out of existence,' Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345."
[Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 at 540, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1185 (1965)]
The Hunter opinion itself intimates that a state legislature may not be omnipotent even as to the disposition of some types of property owned by municipal corporations, 207 U. S., at 178-181. Further, other cases in this Court have refused to allow a State to abolish a municipality, or alter its boundaries, or merge it with another city, without preserving to the creditors of the old city some effective recourse for the collection of debts owed them. Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266. For example, in Mobile v. Watson the Court said:
"Where the resource for the payment of the bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of taxation existing when the bonds were issued, any law which withdraws or limits the taxing power and leaves no adequate means for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and is null and void." Mobile v. Watson, supra, 116 U. S., at 305.
This line of authority conclusively shows that the Court has never acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant 345*345 limitations imposed by the United States Constitution. The observation in Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248, 253, becomes relevant: "The power of the State to alter or destroy its corporations is not greater than the power of the State to repeal its legislation." In that case, which involved the attempt by state officials to evade the collection of taxes to discharge the obligations of an extinguished township, Mr. Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, went on to point out, with reference to the Mount Pleasant and Mobile cases:
"It was argued in those cases, as it is argued in this, that such alteration or destruction of the subordinate governmental divisions was a proper exercise of legislative power, to which creditors had to submit. The argument did not prevail. It was answered, as we now answer it, that such power, extensive though it is, is met and overcome by the provision of the Constitution of the United States which forbids a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. . . ." 200 U. S., at 253-254.
If all this is so in regard to the constitutional protection of contracts, it should be equally true that, to paraphrase, such power, extensive though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State from passing any law which deprives a citizen of his vote because of his race. The opposite conclusion, urged upon us by respondents, would sanction the achievement by a State of any impairment of voting rights whatever so long as it was cloaked in the grab of the realignment of political subdivisions. "It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence." Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583, 594.
[Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)]
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